
Short Answer: Yes, in most cases. INA § 245(d) restricts which relationship a K-1 fiancé(e) may adjust status through — only marriage to the U.S. citizen who filed Form I-129F qualifies — but it does not require that the marriage still exist when USCIS decides the Form I-485. A K-1 entrant who married the petitioner within 90 days and can show that marriage was bona fide may adjust after divorce. The same statute absolutely forecloses adjustment through a different spouse.
Two propositions get collapsed into one constantly, and the difference decides cases.
You cannot substitute a new sponsor is true, and courts have enforced it without exception. You cannot adjust once the marriage ends is false, and has been since at least 2011.
Almost every misunderstanding in this area traces back to treating those as the same rule.
INA § 245(d) permits a nonimmigrant fiancé(e) of a U.S. citizen to adjust status only as a result of the marriage to the citizen who filed the fiancé(e) petition. USCIS states the restriction in the same terms and extends it to K-2 children, who may adjust only on the basis of the parent's marriage to that same petitioner (USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 7, Part B, Ch. 7).
No comparable provision attaches to any other nonimmigrant category. Someone admitted on a B-2, an F-1, or an H-1B who marries a U.S. citizen can generally adjust through that marriage. A K-1 entrant cannot, unless the citizen is the original petitioner.
Adjustment through a different spouse. This is the core prohibition, and the one most often discovered too late. In Markovski v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 108 (4th Cir. 2007) — binding in Maryland — a K-1 entrant who married his petitioner, divorced, and remarried could not adjust through his second wife's I-130 petition. The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in Kalal v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2005), where the fiancé(e) never married her sponsor at all and married someone else instead.
Adjustment on any other basis under section 245. The bar is not limited to marriage-based petitions. It reaches employment-based and other adjustment applications filed under section 245 by someone admitted as a K-1.
Relief under INA § 245(i). Section 245(i) allows certain otherwise-ineligible applicants to adjust on payment of a penalty fee. The Fourth Circuit held in Markovski that subsection (i) affords no relief from subsection (d), agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's earlier conclusion in Kalal. A K-1 entrant cannot buy around the bar.
Adjustment for K-2 derivative children. A K-2 child's path runs through the parent's qualifying marriage. If that marriage never occurred, the child's eligibility closes with the parent's.
Adjustment after the qualifying marriage has ended. This is the point the statute's text does not address and that the Board resolved. In Matter of Sesay, 25 I&N Dec. 431 (BIA 2011), the Board held that a fiancé(e) visa holder may be granted adjustment under INA §§ 245(a) and (d) even if the marriage to the petitioner no longer exists when the application is adjudicated, provided the applicant entered a bona fide marriage with the petitioner within the 90-day period. The holding was consistent with the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2008).
USCIS has adopted the same position, stating that eligibility survives legal termination by death, dissolution, or divorce, and regardless of whether the person has since remarried. What that route requires in practice is covered in my article on getting a green card after a K-1 divorce.
The former spouse's participation. Adjustment in these cases rests on the already-approved Form I-129F. No new petition and no signature from the ex-spouse is required.
Immigrating from abroad through another route. Section 245(d) restricts adjustment of status inside the United States. It does not make someone permanently ineligible to immigrate.
Federal appellate authority on § 245(d) is unusually uniform. In Caraballo-Tavera v. Holder (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit collected decisions applying the bar from the Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, along with the Board's decision in Sesay, noting they had read the statute to prohibit a K-1 admittee from obtaining permanent residence on any basis other than marriage to the K-1 sponsor.
That consistency matters practically. This is not an area where a circuit split creates room to argue, and there is little value in a strategy premised on a court reading the statute differently.
The § 245(d) bar reaches even sympathetic cases, and the clearest illustration involves the Violence Against Women Act.
In Le v. Holder, 732 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 2013), a woman entered on a K-1 and learned on arrival that her fiancé was already married, making the marriage legally impossible. She married a different man months later, was abused by him, testified against him at his criminal trial, and obtained an approved VAWA self-petition. She was still denied adjustment. The Fifth Circuit held that INA §§ 245(a) and (d) announce no special rule creating a VAWA exception to the bar, and that the impossibility of the original marriage did not excuse the failure to depart once she knew it could not occur.
Le is not binding in Maryland, but it reflects how courts have treated arguments that the purpose behind § 245(d) should soften its text.
The distinction that matters: the self-petitioner in Le was abused by someone who was not the K-1 petitioner. A K-1 entrant who married the petitioner and was abused by that petitioner stands differently, because the qualifying marriage is the one the statute contemplates.
A K-1 entrant who does not marry the petitioner within 90 days cannot adjust status in the United States on any basis. This is the harshest application of § 245(d), and it is worth stating plainly because the assumptions people make here are consistently wrong.
K-1 status cannot be extended. The 90-day period is a condition of admission, not a flexible deadline. No application lengthens it.
K nonimmigrants cannot change to another nonimmigrant category. They are expressly listed among the ineligible classes at 8 CFR § 248.2(a)(2). The regulation carves out one exception, for those seeking U nonimmigrant status as victims of qualifying crimes (8 CFR § 248.2(b)).
Unlawful presence begins accruing on day 91, and its consequences scale sharply. Under INA § 212(a)(9)(B), more than 180 days of unlawful presence in a single stay followed by departure triggers a three-year bar on returning; a full year or more triggers a ten-year bar (USCIS Policy Manual, Vol. 8, Part O, Ch. 6).
The timing consequence deserves emphasis. Consider two people in identical legal positions on day 91 — neither can adjust. One departs at month four and faces no bar under § 212(a)(9)(B). The other waits eighteen months hoping something will change, and departs facing a decade. Nothing that happened during those fourteen months created a path that leaving earlier would have destroyed. Only the penalty grew.
The realistic route in that situation is departure followed by consular processing on a new Form I-130, which my article comparing the K-1 visa and the I-130 spousal petition addresses.
The operative question in a K-1 adjustment case is almost never is the couple still married. It is:
If both answers are yes, § 245(d) is satisfied, and the remaining work is evidentiary and discretionary rather than jurisdictional. How the four possible endings differ from there — divorce, annulment, death, and abuse — is the subject of a separate article.
If you're trying to work out which side of that line your case falls on, contact me at SG Legal Group. Consultations are available in English, Spanish, Russian, and Romanian.
Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Immigration laws and policies are subject to change, and individual circumstances vary. For advice specific to your situation, please consult with a qualified immigration attorney.
Oleg Gherasimov, Esq.
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